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Abstract: The model presented in this paper has two objectives. First,
it models global imbalances in a simple way while conserving real and ﬁ-
nancial approaches. This double approach is necessary because Global Im-
balances are due to the conjunction of ﬁnancial and real phenomena: the
increase in the price of commodities, the accumulation of foreign reserves
by the Asian central banks, the limited absorption capacity of the OPEC
countries, the insuﬃcient development of the Asian ﬁnancial system and the
perception of better returns in the US.
The second objective is to model the global saving glut hypothesis and to
show its implications. We start with a model which consists of three identical
countries and then we replicate the current pattern of global imbalances in
introducing three asymmetries: a ﬁxed exchange rate between Asia and the
United States, a limited absorption capacity in Asia and endogenous propen-
sity to spend in the United States. In order to avoid the recession linked to
the increase of their propensity to import, the United States increase their
propensity to spend. This adjustment has a cost: (i) the Global Imbalances
grow quickly with an increase of current account imbalances and net foreign
assets in both the US and Asia ; (ii) the euro area supports an appreciation
of its exchange rate which put it in a long depression.
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" The economist with but one model for the analysis of the bal-
ance of payments has handicapped him- or herself. [...] some-
times capital drives the current account, sometimes the other
way round. "
Kindleberger (1987), p. 11
1 Introduction
During the last years, the Global Imbalances have been increasing. The
weight of both current account imbalances and net foreign assets in the 2006
world economy is twice what it was in 1996 (ﬁgure 1). If we choose an
approach by the real sector, the two big reasons for this growth of Global
Imbalances are the increase of oil prices (ﬁgure 2) and the under evaluation
of the Renminbi (ﬁgure 3). The three major players of the GI are the US,
for deﬁcits, and the OPEC and the Asian countries, for surpluses. The US
suﬀered the brunt of rising price of oil and the under evaluation of Renminbi
and, since the beginning of the millennium, their propensity to spend has
been increasing. This paper presents the alternatives of the US to respond
to this shock and the consequences of their reactions, ﬁrst, on the countries
with ﬂexible exchange rates and, second, on the countries with ﬁxed exchange
rates.
The model presented in this paper has two objectives. First, it mod-
els global imbalances in a simple way while conserving real and ﬁnancial
approaches (the Three-Country model presented here is comprised of 50
equations). This double approach is necessary because Global Imbalances
are due to the conjunction of ﬁnancial and real phenomena: the increase in
the price of oil, the accumulation of foreign reserves by the Asian central
banks (ﬁgure 5), the limited absorption capacity of the OPEC countries, the
insuﬃcient development of the Asian ﬁnancial system and the perception of
better returns in the US. The second objective is to model the global saving
glut hypothesis and to show its implications. We want to demonstrate that
in the present context, the increase in the US propensity to spend would
oﬀset negative impact on their propensity to import, but with an increase in
their net foreign debt. The United States can temporarily avoid a recession
by accumulating debts on the rest of the world as long as ﬁxed exchange rate
countries accept to accumulate dollar assets. In contrast, the exchange rate
of the euro area is the only one to adjust and the impact on European GNP
is negative.
The second part brieﬂy describes the evolution in the economic literature
on global imbalances. The third part presents the model with three identi-
cal ﬂexible exchange rate countries. We introduce the Global Saving Glut
Hypothesis in the fourth part.
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2 A brief review of the literature on Global Imbal-
ances
The article by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) marks the
return at the forefront of the issue of current imbalances in economic lit-
erature. They argue that the Bretton Woods system has returned so their
work has been named Bretton Woods II. The authors consider that the
global imbalances of the 2000s result from an export-led growth strategy
of Asian countries that is similar to the one adopted by Europe and Japan
after the Second World War. In both cases, the surplus countries accumu-
late reserves so that their exchange rate remains undervalued relative to the
dollar. They can maintain their competitiveness and beneﬁt from growth
by exports. However, as Eichengreen (2004) pointed out, the resemblance
to Bretton Woods is limited. The current international monetary system is
a ﬂoating exchange rates one and the consistency between the Asian coun-
tries in the years 2000 is lower than that of Europe during the 1960s. In
addition, the thesis of Bretton Woods II considers the global imbalances re-
sulting from the real sector, i.e. the top of the balance of payments, and the
ﬁnancial sector - i.e. the bottom of the balance of payments - adjust to it.
This vision of global imbalances from the top of the balance of payments
is not adopted in the following papers. The Global Saving Glut Hypothesis,
supported by Bernanke (2005), assumes that the global imbalances result
from both the ﬁnancial and real sectors. The current account surpluses
of the emerging countries have two origins. On the one hand, following
the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997, the Asian emerging countries are accumulating
reserves to cover against a possible sudden exit in foreign capital. At the
same time, they maintain the under evaluation of their exchange rates, and
the exports led their growth. On the other hand, the emergence of new great
industrial countries weighs on oil prices. OPEC countries also emit a surplus
of savings that they want to invest abroad, since their absorption capacity
is limited due to their small population. The saving surplus of the emerging
countries leads to the United States, the economy that presents the best
features. Bernanke lists the special features that make the U.S. ﬁnancial
sector the most attractive. This is the growth of productivity linked to the
development of new technologies, the low political risk, the strong property
rights protection or still favorable institutional environment. These inﬂows
of investments lead an appreciation of the dollar, an increase in asset prices
and, after 2000, lower interest rates and an increase in household wealth. The
combination of these factors motivates households to reduce their savings
and increase consumption. Thus, the global savings glut is absorbed by the
increase in spending of U.S. households that avoids a recession due to an
excess of supply.
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The equilibrium model of Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2006) ex-
plains growth of GI by the inability of ﬁnancial systems of certain areas to
achieve suﬃcient investment to use all the savings available. The current
pattern of GI and the low global interest rates result from the diﬀerences
on the ﬁnancial institutions development in the world and from the greatest
potential growth of the United States compared to other ﬁnancially devel-
oped areas. This thesis provides a new element to explain the accumulation
of foreign assets by Asian countries beyond the level of reserves to provide
assurance against a ﬂight of foreign capital. Furthermore, Caballero et al.
(2006), all kinds of models have been developed to represent the evolution
of global imbalances. In Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005) the adjustment occurs
by changing the preferences between tradable and non tradable goods and
between domestic and foreign goods. The model of Blanchard, Giavazzi and
Sa (2005) stressed the role of the exchange rate in the allocation of interna-
tional portfolio. These three models have a major disadvantage that should
be overcome: they assume that the GDP are not aﬀected by the adjustments
of current imbalances. In the continuous time model with two countries
Asada, Chiarella, Flaschel and Franke (2003) and Proaño (2008), the GDP
reacts to the adjustment of current imbalances, but they only model the real
sector. Finally, models of Lavoie and Zhao (2008), Godley and Lavoie (2007)
and Zhao (2006) have the advantage of being stock-ﬂow consistent and of
representing both the top and the bottom of the balance of payments. How-
ever, they should be simpliﬁed (Lavoie, 2008): these three-country models
comprise 91, 79 and 89 equations, respectively. In his review of the state of
macroeconomics, Blanchard (2008) also argues for smaller models to capture
a speciﬁc mechanism. He cites Solow including:
" My general preference is for small, transparent, tailored models,
often partial equilibrium, usually aimed at understanding some
little piece of the (macro-) economic mechanism. "
Solow (2008)
In order to replicate the global imbalances of the 2000s, we use an ab-
sorption model to describe the real sector and a portfolio model to describe
the ﬁnancial sector. The interest of such a model is to take into consideration
simultaneously factors linked to several interpretations of global imbalances:
• The trade balance approach: the increase of the propensity to import
Asian products in the United States and in Europe.
• the absorption approach: the limited absorption capacity in Asian and
OPEC countries.
• The saving-investment approach: the consumption of the global saving
glut by the United States.
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• The portfolio balance approach: the accumulation of reserves in Asian
countries to cover against a risk of sudden exit of capitals and the in-
ability of Asian ﬁnancial systems to absorb the whole domestic saving.
We start with a model which consists of three identical countries and then
we replicate the current pattern of global imbalances by introducing three
asymmetries: a ﬁxed exchange rate between Asia and the United States, a
limited absorption capacity in Asia and an endogenous propensity to spend
in the United States.
3 A model of three identical countries with ﬂexible
exchange rates
The model is composed of three identical countries. These economies ex-
change goods and services and hold foreign assets that provide incomes. We
assume the three countries are at equilibrium before shocks: trade equilib-
rium, current account equilibrium, zero net foreign debt and stable exchange
rates. The model is divided into two sectors. The real sector (3.1) describes
the equations of national income, domestic demand, imports, exports and in-
come balance. The ﬁnancial sector (3.2) presents the evolution of supply and
demand for foreign assets and allows determining the net external position
and the exchange rate. Simulations (3.3) illustrate the eﬀect of an increase
in the propensity to spend and the impact of a competitiveness shock.
3.1 The real sector
The real sector is represented synthetically in order to focus only on the
adjustment mechanisms vis-à-vis the rest of the world. We use a model of
absorption à la Alexander (1952). The interest of this approach is to focus on
macroeconomic, based around expenditure and production in the economy
as a whole, in the domestic and international perspectives. When absorp-
tion is lower than national income, the country has a current account surplus
and vice versa. In the propensity to spend (c), it does not distinguish the
propensity to spend of households (1 - s), ﬁrms (i) and government (g):
c = 1− s+ i+ g
The subject of the paper is not to explain the government's way of interven-
ing but to deﬁne the level of domestic spending that it should attempt to
achieve through ﬁscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. The ﬁscal pol-
icy acts on the budget deﬁcit (g). The monetary policy changes saving and
investment levels, in particular, playing on interest rates. Finally, changes
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in central bank reserves allow to compensate for current account imbalances
without modifying the exchange rate. In the model with ﬂexible exchange
rates, the level of domestic expenditure (D) is determined like Samuelson
(1939) and Hicks (1956), the propensity to spend of the country (c) and
its GNP in the previous period (Yt−1). We assume that before the shock
the propensity to spend is equal to one in the three countries 1, 2 and 3:
c1 = c2 = c3 = 1.
Dit = c
i × Y it−1 with i = 1, 2, 3 (1)
Imports are deﬁned as standard by levels of expenditure (D) and relative
prices (e), approached by the nominal exchange rate (that implies P 1 =
P 2 = P 3 = 1). Country i's currency is the CU i and the exchange rate
between country i and country j is: 1CU i = eijCU j . For instance, we use
the exchange rate e12 to convert CU2 to CU1.
IM ijt = m0
ij(Dit−1)
m1ij (eijt−1)
m2ij with i = 1, 2, 3 ; j = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j (2)
We determine country i's propensity to import from country j (µ) by the
ratio of imports on expenditures.
µijt =
IM ijt
Dit
(3)
The balance of investment incomes between country i and country j is cal-
culated as the diﬀerence between incomes received and incomes paid taking
into account exchange rate variations:
INCijt = (ω
ij
t−1W
i
t−1r
j
t−1
eijt−1
eijt
)− (ωjit−1
W jt−1
eijt−1
rit−1) (4)
Incomes received from country j are deﬁned by the share (ωij) of country i's
wealth (W i) invested in country j at the previous period, times the rate of
return in country j (rj), times the exchange rate variation (e
ij
t−1
eijt
). Incomes
paid by country i to country j are deﬁned by the share (ωji) of country j's
wealth (W j) invested in country i at the previous period, times the rate of
return in country i (ri).
Then, we determine the GNP by the sum of the absorption (or expendi-
ture Overall residents) A, the trade balance (the diﬀerence between exports
and imports) X − IM and the income balance INC.
Y = A+ (X − IM) + INC
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with D = A+ IM
The GNP corresponds to domestic demand (the ﬁrst member), plus ex-
ports (the second and third members), plus net income investment (fourth
and ﬁfth members).
Y it = (1− µijt − µikt )Dit + µjit (Djt )eijt + µki(Dkt )ekit + INCijt + INCikt (5)
with i = 1, 2, 3 ; j = 1, 2, 3 ; k = 1, 2, 3 and i 6= j 6= k
The real sector allows for determining the trade balance. The trade deﬁcit
(TD) is the diﬀerence between imports and exports expressed in domestic
currency:
TDijt = IM
ij
t − ejit × IM jit (6)
3.2 The ﬁnancial sector
A portfolio model à la Kouri (1981) which incorporates the mechanical
of Blanchard et al. model (2005) represents the ﬁnancial sector. It is used
to determine exchange rates. The propensity to hold foreign assets is deter-
mined in accordance with the horizontal constraint of Godley (1996), i.e.,
for each equation, the sum of all rates of return coeﬃcients (λ) is equal to
zero. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the rates of return are the
same in the three countries (r1 = r2 = r3).
ωijt = λ0
ij − λ1ij(rit) + λ2ij(rjt )− λ3ij(rkt ) (7)
Net foreign debt is equal to the value of assets held by foreign investors
in the country, minus the value of assets held by domestic investors abroad,
plus the trade deﬁcit vis-à-vis the foreign country.
NFDijt = ω
ji
t−1
W jt−1
eijt−1
(1 + rit−1)− ωijt−1W it−1(1 + rjt−1)
eijt−1
eijt
+ TDijt (8)
The quantity of the assets held by investors from country j in country i is
equal to the share (ωji) of country j's wealth (W jt−1) held in country i during
the previous period, times the exchange rate between country i and country
j (1CU j = ejiCU i), times the rate of return of country i's assets in CU i
(1 + rit−1). The value of assets held by investors from country i in country
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j is equal to the share of country i's wealth of the previous period (W it−1),
times the propensity to hold assets of country j (ωijt−1), times the rate of
return on assets of country j in CU i ((1 + rjt−1)×
eijt−1
eijt
).
The supply of domestic assets BS is given by a ratio κ of GNP Y :
BSit = κ
i(Y it ) (9)
For the sake of clarity, we set: κ1 = κ2 = κ3 = 1 (assuming that the
supply of assets is the same size as GNP). The domestic wealth (W ) is
equal to the supply of domestic assets (BS ) minus the net foreign debt NFD
expressed in home currency.
W it = BS
i
t −NFDijt −NFDikt (10)
The exchange rate eij (to convert country j's currency into country i's cur-
rency) is deﬁned so as to equalize the liabilities of country i and the assets
of country j:
eijt [NFD
ij
t + ω
ij
t (W
i
t )] = ω
ji
t (W
j
t )
We replace W i and W j by their expressions:
W it = BS
i
t −NFDijt −NFDikt
W jt = BS
j
t + (NFD
ij
t )e
ij
t −NFDjkt
We get the following expression:
eijt [NFD
ij
t +ω
ij
t (BS
i
t−NFDijt −NFDikt )] = ωjit [BSjt+(NFDijt )eijt −NFDjkt ]
This equation determines the exchange rate between country i and coun-
try j:
eijt =
ωjit (BS
j
t )−NFDjkt
ωijt (BSit −NFDikt ) + (1− ωjit − ωijt )NFDijt
(11)
We remark that as in the Blanchard et al. model, the higher the assets
supply, the lower the exchange rate variation resulting from current account
imbalances. Furthermore, as country j's net foreign debt vis-à-vis country k
increases, the country i's currency is weakened compared to country j's cur-
rency, because the country j's assets supply available in country i decreases.
Similarly, when country i's net foreign debt vis-à-vis country k increases, its
exchange rate apprises because country i's assets supply available in country
j decreases.
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3.3 The simulations in a world without asymmetries
3.3.1 Scénario 1: a shock on country 1's propensity to spend
Country 1's propensity to spend increases from 1 to 1.005 (ﬁgure 3).
This rise provokes an increase of country 1's GNP and a growth of assets
supply. As a result, country 1's currency is depreciated compared to two
other countries currencies. The competitiveness of country 1 increases so
it releases a trade surplus, a current account surplus and its net foreign
position improves. Its trade surplus is shrinking gradually with the growth
of its GNP but its current account surplus continues to increase because
trade surplus reduction is oﬀset by an elevation of the net income related to
the depreciation of its currency.
3.3.2 Scenario 2: a shock on the propensity to import of countries
1 and 2
In countries 1 and 2, the propensity to import goods made in country 3
passes from 0.05 to 0.055 (ﬁgure 4). The GNP of countries 1 and 2 decrease
while that of country 3 increases. The currencies of countries 1 and 2 de-
preciate relative to the country 3 to return to current account equilibrium.
As a ﬁrst step, the country 3's trade balance surplus allows it to accumulate
assets in the rest of the world. As a second step, the country 3 recorded a
trade deﬁcit which is oﬀset by the receipt of net income. A new equilibrium
is established in which the country 3 consumes more goods than it produces
because the balance of investment incomes procures him a rent. Thus, in a
"perfect world" without asymmetries, productivity shocks are adjusted by
exchange rate changes and do not generate global imbalances. Results of
simulations under ﬂexible exchange rates are presented in table 2.
4 Modeling the global saving glut hypothesis
We start from the previous three-country model to describe the relation-
ships between the three major areas that currently interact. The country
1 is the United States who hold the currency on which some countries are
pegged. The country 2 is named the euro area and it comprises ﬂexible ex-
change rates countries. The country 3 is named Asia and it includes ﬁxed
exchange rates countries. However, this model does not describe the current
global imbalances since it ignores several key features of the global economy.
We introduce three asymmetries in the previous model in order to replicate
the global imbalances of the 2000s and to show their implications on growth.
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First, some countries have ﬁxed exchange rates so the Asian propen-
sity to hold foreign securities must be determined to leave unchanged its
exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar (4.1). Second, the limited absorption ca-
pacity of OPEC and Asia should be take into account (4.2). Third, the
Bernanke's global saving glut hypothesis is described by a model endogeniz-
ing the American propensity to spend to maintain the income of the United
States unchanged (4.3). Simulations show the eﬀects of expansionary poli-
tics, of under-evaluation of the Renminbi and of the absorption by the United
States of the global saving glut (4.4).
4.1 First asymmetry: Asia pegs its currency on the dollar
In this case, the adjustment is made by modifying the Asian home bias
as long as it agrees to acquire securities issued to oﬀset the current account
imbalance. The home bias compatible with a ﬁxed exchange rate allows
equalizing supply and demand for U.S. assets without modifying exchange
rates:
[NFD13t + ω
13
t (W
1
t )]e
13
t = ω
31
t (W
3
t )
We replace W 1 and W 3 by their expressions and we get the following ex-
pression:
[NFD13t + ω
13
t (BS
1
t − NFD13t − NFD12t )]e13t = ω31t (BS3t + NFD13t e13t −
NFD32t )
This equation gives the level of home bias that adjusts current account im-
balances while maintaining the exchange rate unchanged:
ω31t =
ω13t (BS
1
t −NFD12t ) + (1− ω13t )NFD13t
BS3t−NFD32t
e13t
+NFD13t
(12)
Since Asia is in ﬁxed exchange rates vis-à-vis the United States, this equation
replaces the equation of the exchange rate between the United States and
Asia in the previous model.
4.2 Second asymmetry: the limited absorption capacity of
ﬁxed exchange rates countries
The absorption capacity of country 3 is limited for two reasons. On
the one hand, we assume that Asia reach its maximum absorption capacity
because its ﬁnancial system is not able to use domestic saving. On the other
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hand, the absorption capacity of OPEC countries is limited due to their
small population. We model this dual limit by assuming that the level of
expenditure of the country 3 is ﬁxed ∆D3 = 0. Then the propensity to
spend adjusts changes in income:
c3t =
D3
Y 3t−1
(13)
This equation replaces equation 3 of the previous model.
4.3 Third asymmetry: the U.S. propensity to spend is en-
dogenized to maintain constant U.S. GNP
We determine the level of the U.S. propensity to spend that can avoid
a recession in the United States resulting from country 3's current account
surplus. The level of propensity to spend which can absorb the shock c1∗
is determined in Brender and Pisani (2007). We highlight the equilibrium
values (pre-shock). As a ﬁrst step, we equalize pre-shock income 	Y1 with
post-shock income Y1 :
Y 1 = Y¯ 1
With D3 = D¯3, D1 = c1(Y 1t−1) and c1 = 1, so it comes:
(1 − µ12t − µ13t )c1∗(Y 1t−1) + µ21t (D2t )e21t + µ31t (D3)e31t + INC12t + INC13t =
(1− µ¯12 − µ¯13)× Y 1t−1 + µ¯21(D¯2)e¯21 + µ¯31(D3)e¯31 + ¯INC12 + ¯INC13
Then we determine the level of c1* which maintain the American GNP con-
stant after a competitiveness shock:
c1∗ = µ¯
21(D¯2)e¯21−µ21t D2t e21t +D3[µ¯31(e¯31)−µ31t (e31t )−INC12t −INC13t ]
(1−µ12t −µ13t )Y 1t−1
+
1− µ¯12 − µ¯13
1− µ12t − µ13t
(14)
To avoid a global recession, the U.S. must increase their propensity to spend
c1 in order to compensate for the reduction in Asia c3.
4.4 The simulations
The ﬁrst two simulations are under asymmetries 1 and 2. In this case,
the productivity shock implies a growth of global imbalances and a recession
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in the United States and in Europe. When we introduce the third asym-
metry, the US GNP is stabilized, but the global imbalances are bigger and
the negative eﬀect on the European GNP is stronger. The results of these
simulations are summarized in table 3.
4.4.1 Scenario 1: a shock on the U.S. propensity to spend without
global saving glut hypothesis
The U.S. propensity to spend rises from 1 to 1.005. The supply of U.S.
securities and the American GNP increase (ﬁgure 5). The result is a de-
preciation of the dollar vis-à-vis the euro and an increase in Asian reserves
to avoid an appreciation of &. The increase in the GNP generates a trade
deﬁcit vis-à-vis Asia that is partly oﬀset by a surplus vis-à-vis Europe. The
euro area has a trade deﬁcit with the United States and Asia as the euro
appreciates against currencies of both countries. The net external debt of
the United States and Europe increase and their net income is negative. Fi-
nally, Asia has a current account surplus and the United States and Europe
a deﬁcit. The European GNP decreases and that of Asia expands.
4.4.2 Scenario 2: a shock on the propensity to import of countries
1 and 2 without global saving glut hypothesis
The propensity to import Asian products to the United States and Eu-
rope increased from 0.05 to 0.055 (ﬁgure 6). The trade balances of both
economies decline while Asia has a surplus. The trade balances tend to re-
turn to equilibrium with the depreciation of the euro vis-à-vis both Asian
and American currencies and with the decline of European and U.S. GNP.
Asia accumulates U.S. assets in order to avoid an appreciation of its cur-
rency. This accumulation leads to an increase of Asian net incomes. The
U.S. GNP diminishes gradually to adjust the shock. The European GNP
is reduced and then stabilized after the euro has depreciated. Finally, the
increase of U.S. and European propensity to import causes a global recession
and growing global imbalances.
4.4.3 Scenario 3: a shock on the propensity to import from coun-
tries 1 and 2 with global saving glut hypothesis
In this case, the propensity to spend of the United States adjusts it-
self in order to maintain their GNP unchanged following the increase in
their propensity to import Asian products (ﬁgure 7). The dollar depreciates
against the euro since the eﬀect of the propensity to spend is stronger than
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the one of the propensity to import. Asia accumulates U.S. assets to main-
tain the level of its exchange rate with the dollar. The trade and current
account imbalances persist. Thus, global imbalances grow rapidly: the cur-
rent account deﬁcit and the net foreign debt of the United States continue
to rise as the current account surplus and the net foreign assets of Asia.
External imbalances in the Euro area are less important. The adjustment
takes place through the gradual reduction of European GNP that is linked
to the deteriorating competitiveness.
The results of simulations under the global saving glut hypothesis are
very close to the evolution of the pattern of global imbalances in the 2000s.
The trend in the current account imbalances are similar to a surplus in Asia
and a deﬁcit in the United States (ﬁgure 11). However, according to the
simulation, the euro area should be in deﬁcit but the observations show a
diﬀerent trend around the equilibrium. The trends in net foreign debts are
very akin observations: a growing net debt in the United States, a soaring
net stock of assets in Asia and a smoothly increasing net debt in the euro
area (ﬁgure 12).
5 Conclusion
The model includes a real and ﬁnancial approach of global imbalances.
The three-country model only has 50 equations  or about half of the models
of Zhao (2006), Godley and Lavoie (2007) and Lavoie and Zhao (2008) 
although, unlike the models of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2005), Blanchard et al
(2005) and Caballero et al (2006), it does not involve a constant GNP. Thus,
we can observe both the real and ﬁnancial implications of the shocks.
A ﬁrst series of simulations is conducted in a model with three identical
countries under ﬂexible exchange rates. The increase in the propensity to im-
port country 3's products in countries 1 and 2 causes a reduction of the GNP
of both countries and provokes small external imbalances that stabilize after
the depreciation of exchange rates. Then, we introduce three asymmetries in
order to model the global saving glut hypothesis. First, the Asia-OPEC area
is pegged on the dollar. Second, we assume a limited absorption capacity
in ﬁxed exchange rates countries tied to the small population in the OPEC
countries and to the limited ﬁnancial development in Asia. Third, under
the Bernanke's global saving glut hypothesis, it is assumed that the United
States raise their propensity to spend in order to maintain their GNP stable
following an increase in their propensity to import.
Under the ﬁrst two constraints, the productivity shock implies the stag-
nation of Asian GNP and a strong negative eﬀect on US GNP and that of
the euro area. By adding the third asymmetry, it appears that the reces-
sion can be avoided in the United States if they increase their propensity to
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spend. However, the consequences for the global economy would be disas-
trous: global imbalances grow very fast and the euro area experiences a deep
recession. Finally, we ﬁnd that the trend of simulations are very close to the
observed trends of the pattern of global imbalances both in stocks and in
ﬂows.
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6 Appendix
A Parameters
We remark that:
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• in the ﬂexible exchange rates model there are 50 endogenous equations
for 50 equations,
• the model with a ﬁxed exchange rate between the U.S. and Asia has
49 equations for 49 endogenous variables,
• when we introduce the global saving glut hypothesis, there are 50 equa-
tions for 50 unknowns.
16
Notations
Description Status 
Initial 
value
Notations
Description Status 
Initial 
value
Notations
Description Status
Initial 
value
c1
Propensity to spend 
exogenous/ 
endogenous*
1 c2
Propensity to spend 
exogenous
1 c3
Propensity to spend 
exogenous/ 
endogenous*
1
k1
supply of domestic assets/GDP 
ratio 
exogenous
1 k2
supply of domestic assets/GDP 
ratio 
exogenous
1 k3
supply of domestic assets/GDP 
ratio 
exogenous
1
ex
exchange rate (1 $ = ex &)
endogenous/ 
exogenous*
1 ex/e
exchange rate (1 £ = ex/e &) implicit
1 1/ex
exchange rate (1 & = 1/ex $) implicit
1
m120
constant in the equation of 
imports of European products
exogenous
0.05 m210
constant in the equation of 
imports of American products
exogenous
0.05 m310
constant in the equation of 
imports of American products
exogenous
0.05
m121
income elasticity in the equation 
of imports of European products
exogenous
1 m211
income elasticity in the equation 
of imports of American products
exogenous
1 m311
income elasticity in the equation 
of imports of American products
exogenous
1
m122
price elasticity in the equation of 
imports of European products
exogenous
1 m212
price elasticity in the equation of 
imports of American products
exogenous
1 m312
price elasticity in the equation of 
imports of American products
exogenous
1
m130
constant in the equation of 
imports of Asian products
exogenous
0.05 m230
constant in the equation of 
imports of Asian products
exogenous
0.05 m320
constant in the equation of 
imports of European products
exogenous
0.05
m131
income elasticity in the equation 
of imports of Asian products
exogenous
1 m231
income elasticity in the equation 
of imports of Asian products
exogenous
1 m321
income elasticity in the equation 
of imports of European products
exogenous
1
m132
price elasticity in the equation of 
imports of Asian products
exogenous
1 m232
price elasticity in the equation of 
imports of Asian products
exogenous
1 m322
price elasticity in the equation of 
imports of European products
exogenous
1
r1
interest rate
exogenous
0.04 r2
interest rate
exogenous
0.04 r3
interest rate
exogenous
0.04
λ120
constant in the  propensity to hold 
European assets equation
exogenous
0.1 λ210
constant in the  propensity to hold 
American assets equation
exogenous
0.1 λ310
constant in the  propensity to hold 
American assets equation
exogenous
0.1
λ121
coefficient on r1 in  propensity to 
hold European assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ211
coefficient on r1 in  propensity to 
hold American assets equation
exogenous
0.4 λ311
coefficient on r1 in  propensity to 
hold American assets equation
exogenous
0.4
λ122
coefficient on r2 in  propensity to 
hold European assets equation
exogenous
0.4 λ212
coefficient on r2 in  propensity to 
hold American assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ312
coefficient on r2 in  propensity to 
hold American assets equation
exogenous
0.2
λ123
coefficient on r3 in  propensity to 
hold European assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ213
coefficient on r3 in  propensity to 
hold American assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ313
coefficient on r3 in  propensity to 
hold American assets equation
exogenous
0.2
λ130
constant in the  propensity to hold 
Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.1 λ230
constant in the  propensity to hold 
Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.1 λ320
constant in the  propensity to hold 
European assets equation
exogenous
0.1
λ131
coefficient on r1 in  propensity to 
hold Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ231
coefficient on r1 in  propensity to 
hold Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ321
coefficient on r1 in  propensity to 
hold European assets equation
exogenous
0.2
λ132
coefficient on r2 in  propensity to 
hold Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ232
coefficient on r2 in  propensity to 
hold Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.2 λ322
coefficient on r2 in  propensity to 
hold European assets equation
exogenous
0.4
λ133
coefficient on r3 in  propensity to 
hold Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.4 λ233
coefficient on r3 in  propensity to 
hold Asian assets equation
exogenous
0.4 λ323
coefficient on r3 in  propensity to 
hold European assets equation
exogenous
0.2
ω12
propensity to hold European 
assets
endogenous
0.2 ω21
propensity to hold American 
assets
endogenous
0.2 ω31
propensity to hold American 
assets
endogenous*
0.2
ω13
propensity to hold Asian assets endogenous
0.2 ω23
propensity to hold Asian assets endogenous
0.2 ω33
propensity to hold European 
assets
endogenous
0.2
D1
domestic demand endogenous
100 D2
domestic demand endogenous
100 D3
domestic demand
endogenous/ 
exogenous
100
IM12
imports of European products endogenous
5 IM21
imports of American products endogenous
5 IM31
imports of American products endogenous
5
IM13
imports of Asian products endogenous
5 IM23
imports of Asian products endogenous
5 IM32
imports of European products endogenous
5
µ12
propensity to import European 
products
endogenous
0.05 µ21
propensity to import American 
products
endogenous
0.05 µ31
propensity to import American 
products
endogenous
0.05
µ13
propensity to import Asian 
products
endogenous
0.05 µ23
propensity to import Asian 
products
endogenous
0.05 µ32
propensity to import European 
products
endogenous
0.05
Y1
GNP endogenous
100 Y2
GNP endogenous
100 Y3
GNP endogenous
100
DC12
commercial deficit vis-à-vis the 
euro area
endogenous
0 DC21
commercial deficit vis-à-vis the 
United States
endogenous
0 DC31
commercial deficit vis-à-vis the 
United States
endogenous
0
DC13
commercial deficit vis-à-vis Asia endogenous
0 DC23
commercial deficit vis-à-vis Asia endogenous
0 DC32
commercial deficit vis-à-vis the 
euro area
endogenous
0
NFD12
net foreign debt vis-à-vis the euro 
area
endogenous
0 NFD21
net foreign debt vis-à-vis the 
United States
endogenous
0 NFD31
net foreign debt vis-à-vis the 
United States
endogenous
0
NFD13
net foreign debt vis-à-vis Asia endogenous
0 NFD23
net foreign debt vis-à-vis Asia endogenous
0 NFD32
net foreign debt vis-à-vis the euro 
area
endogenous
0
BS1
supply of domestic assets endogenous
100 BS2
supply of domestic assets endogenous
100 BS3
supply of domestic assets endogenous
100
W1
national wealth endogenous
100 W2
national wealth endogenous
100 W3
national wealth endogenous
100
INC12
Net income transfers between 
U.S. and European
endogenous
0 INC21
Net income transfers between 
U.S. and European
endogenous
0 INC31
Net income transfers between 
U.S. and Asian
endogenous
0
INC13
Net income transfers between 
U.S. and Asian
endogenous
0 INC23
Net income transfers between 
European and Asian
endogenous
0 INC32
Net income transfers between 
European and Asian
endogenous
0
e
exchange rate (1 $ = e £) endogenous
1 1/e
exchange rate (1 £ = 1/e $) implicit
1 e/ex
exchange rate (1 & = e/ex £) implicit
1
* the first term indicates the status of the variable in the first model in flexible exchange rates. the second term indicates the status of the variable when the country is in 3 fixed exchange
   and the assumption of surplus global savings is made.
United States Euro area Asia
Table 1: Values of model parameters
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Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 1$ = e € 1 $ = e ¥ 1 € = e ¥ Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3
Shock on US propensity to spend (↑c1)  + − − − − 0  + − −  + − −
Shock on propensity to import Asian 
goods of the United States and of the euro 
area (↑µ13 and ↑µ23)
− −  + 0 − − − (0) − (0)  + (0) − −  +
GDP (Y) Exchange rate Current account balance Net foreign assets (-NFD)
Table 2: Results under ﬂexible exchange rates (long term eﬀects in brackets)
Exchange 
rate
Asian 
propensity 
to hold US 
assets
United 
States
Euro area Asia 1$ = e € ω31
United 
States
Euro area Asia
United 
States
Euro area Asia
 + −  + −  + − −  + − −  +
− −  +  +  + − − (0)  + − − (small)  +
0 −  + −  + − −  + − − (small)  +
GDP (Y) Current account balance Net foreign assets (-NFD)
Shock on US propensity to spend (↑c1)
Shock on propensity to import Asian goods of the 
United States and of the euro area (↑µ13 and ↑µ23)
Shock on propensity to import Asian goods of the 
United States and of the euro area (↑µ13 and ↑µ23) 
with an endogenous US propensity to spend (c1)
Table 3: Results under ﬁxed exchange rates (long term eﬀects in brackets)
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Figure 1: Evolution of global imbalances in ﬂows and stocks
Source: CEPII-Chelem, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
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Figure 2: Evolution of the crude oil price (dollars a barrel)Source: IMF, IFS
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Figure 3: Evolution of the US exchange rate vis-à-vis China and the euro
area (1$ = e× CUR)
Source: OECD, Eurostat
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Figure 4: Evolution of current account imbalances (in billions of dollars)
Source: CEPII-Chelem
Figure 5: Evolution of reserves minus gold (in billions of dollars)
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
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Figure 6: Country 1's propensity to spend increases from 1 to 1.005, in
ﬂexible exchange rates
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Figure 7: The propensities to import goods made in country 3 passe from
0.05 to 0.055, in ﬂexible exchange rates
22
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
United States Euro area Asia
Net Foreign Assets (scen. 1)
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
.09
.10
.11
.12
.13
.14
.15
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Exchange rate (1$ = e€) Demand of US assets by Asia
Exchange rates & Demand of US assets by Asia (scen. 1)
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
United States Euro area Asia
Trade balance, % of GNP (scen. 1)
0.96
0.98
1.00
1.02
1.04
1.06
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
United States Euro area Asia
GNP (scen. 1)
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
.002
.004
.006
.008
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
United States Euro area Asia
Current account, % of GNP (scen. 1)
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
United States Euro area Asia
Net income, % of GNP (scen. 1)
Figure 8: The US propensity to spend increases from 1 to 1.005, with ﬁxed
exchange rates and limited absorption capacity
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Figure 9: The propensities to import Asian goods to the United States and
to the euro area passe from 0.05 to 0.055, with ﬁxed exchange rates and
limited absorption capacity
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Figure 10: Global saving glut hypothesis: the propensities to import Asian
goods to the United States and to the euro area passe from 0.05 to 0.055,
with ﬁxed exchange rates, limited absorption capacity and endogenous US
propensity to spend
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Figure 11: Evolution of current account imbalances (% of GDP)
Source: CEPII-Chelem
Figure 12: Evolution of Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP)
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
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